Education of the Girl Child in India

The Social, Cultural, and Economic Factors

‪By Aliza Keen
Aliza Keen, a third-year student at Albany Law School, did her undergraduate work at DePauw University where she majored in both English Writing and Conflict Studies. She is a Senior Editor for International Law Studies and a member of the Women’s Law Caucus.
She has worked as a law clerk at Carter Conboy and the Civil Service Employees, as well as a legal intern at Gyandoh Asmah & Co., a law firm in Accra, Ghana. She is currently a law clerk at Hiscock & Barclay, LLP.
This paper was prepared for Professor Farley’s International Children’s Rights class.


Education is both an idea and commodity that we as a society, country, and world should invest in. Education has the power to break boundaries, encourage development, a sense of self worth, and inspire progress. On a larger scale, a successful educational system has the ability to bolster a country, stimulate an economy, and inspire personal progress. Unfortunately, many times the opportunity to gain an education in India is not as accessible and available to female children as they are to male children.

India has the second largest school system in the world, with roughly 800,000 primary and upper primary schools, 1.9 million teachers, and 111 million students in the ‘recognized’ schools. However, India reports that roughly twenty-five percent of their girl population is not enrolled in schools, compared to that of ten percent for boys. There are a number of factors that affect the education of the girl child in India. For the purposes of this paper, the three factors that will be discussed are the social, cultural and economic factors.
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To read the paper, open HERE.

Energy Subsidies under the WTO

Hopes of a Level Playing Field for Fossil Fuels and Renewable Energy

By Francis T. Dwyer
Francis Dwyer is a 2014 graduate of Albany Law School where he was an associate editor on Albany Law Review and a member of the Environmental Law Society. He received his undergraduate degree from the University at Albany where he studied Sociology and Criminal Justice.
He is currently an Excelsior Service Fellow at New York State Department of Public Service, in the Office of General Counsel.
This paper was prepared for Professor Halewood’s International Trade Law seminar.


Government subsidies in the energy sector affect both international trade and the environment. Currently, there is a trend that promotes subsidizing fossil fuels and stifles subsidies on renewable energy sources. From an environmentalist’s point of view, this is the opposite of what subsidy regulation should be. The World Trade Organization (WTO) should regulate subsidies in a way that discourages the consumption of fossil fuel and encourages the development of renewable energy sources.

This paper first lays out subsidy regulation under the WTO generally and takes a look at how disputes are settled. It then discusses the issues surrounding subsidies on fossil fuels and renewable energy sources, respectively. Finally, it addresses what can be done to solve these problems regarding energy subsidies in order to promote WTO rules that address environmental concerns.

This paper argues that through the use of a multilateral agreement, the WTO can and should administer rules that have ultimate authority to regulate energy as it relates to international trade. Such an “Agreement on Energy” could address energy and international trade in a similar fashion as the Agreement on Agriculture addresses trade issues surrounding agriculture.

The WTO has noted the importance of environmental issues, now it needs to do something. An agreement on energy subsidies is a great place to start. Clear rules could still protect the policy interests surrounding fossil fuel subsidies while promoting renewable energy subsidies. The goal is to create an equal playing field to subsidize both energy sources.
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To read the paper, open HERE.

Abortion and Gender Selection Issues under China’s One Child Policy

 Implications under the Convention on the Rights of the Child

By Yan Rong Yang
Yan Rong Yang is a third year student at Albany Law School. She is a graduate of State University of New York at Albany, magna cum laude, where she majored in political science and history. She is currently interning at the New York State Justice Center for the Protection of People with Special Needs. When she was a child, her family immigrated to the United States from China in the mid-1990s. 
Yan Rong prepared this paper for Professor Anthony Farley’s course, International Child Rights.


Modernization has not only allowed for the development of technology, but also human rights. The future of each country lies in the hands of our children. Yet, even in the 21st century, we have countries like China placing a governmental limitation on our rights to reproduce. The “One-Child Policy” has been a center of many political debates, seen as an injustice to Chinese couples who wants the freedom to create more than one life. Here, rather than evaluating that injustice from the views of an adult, the One-Child policy is considered thoroughly from the rights of the child.

China has adopted the articles issued under Children’s Rights Convention (CRC), yet they have failed to obey these articles time and time again. The One-Child policy has caused difficulty for the lives of the “illegal” children. They are abandoned, ripped out of their mother’s wombs, murdered, trafficked, and discriminated against by their own government and government fearing parents.

The age and definition of a child will not change; however, what can be changed is how the policies are implemented. In order to lessen the harm that is done, or has already been done, such as the sex ratio of male to females, China needs to reconsider their responsibilities under CRC. That way, a new generation that can live without facing the effects of the harsh one-child policy.
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To read the paper, open HERE.

Genocide: The International Community’s Response

By Bryan Kotowski
Bryan Kotowski graduated from University at Albany SUNY in 2013 where he majored in Psychology. He was accepted into the “3 plus 3” SUNY Albany and Albany Law pipeline program and is now a third year law student at Albany Law.
During his time in law school he has participated in the Gabrielli Appellate Advocacy Competition where he was a Quarter-Finalist, worked with attorneys at the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration and Custom Enforcement and studied International Business Transactions in Rome, Italy. 
After law school, Bryan is hoping to pursue a position as a JAG Officer in the United States Army, which he hopes will later lead to a career with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
This essay was prepared for Prof. Bonventre's International Law of War and Crime Seminar.


I. Genocide; Generally

Genocide is defined as “any of the following acts committed with an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

While genocide was originally thought of as a crime against humanity it became it’s own separate offense in 1948 with the adoption of the U.N. Genocide Convention. This Convention not only punishes acts of genocide but those acts associated with genocide, such as the “conspiracy to commit genocide”, as well as establishes individual criminal responsibility and international state responsibility for genocide. The Convention has been “widely acknowledged as representing customary international law.”

II. Historical Examples of Genocide

Even with the adoption of this Convention, “nearly fifty genocides have occurred” since, in places including the “Ukraine, Burundi, Paraguay, [and] Cambodia”, and resulting in the deaths of millions of people. Some of the more recent examples of genocide include the genocide of the Tutsis by the Hutu in Rwanda in 1994, Slobodan Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in 1999, and the civil war that has been taking place in Sudan, primarily Darfur, since 2003 and has claimed over two million lives.

III. Origins of Genocide

The origins of genocide tend to stem from the tensions that arise among differing social, economic, ethnic, religious, racial or even political groups, which may be caused by mistreatment, discrimination, or scarcity of resources to name a few.

In Darfur, the conflict arose over land disputes between Arab nomads and African farming villages. The predominantly Muslim government of Sudan supported the Arab nomads causing hostilities to arise and for the African farmers to form a rebel group called the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA). As the situation began to escalate, with military attacks carried out by both sides, the government began coordinating with an Islamic group known as the Janjaweed who began raping and murdering its way through the African villages in Darfur. The Janjaweed’s actions have resulted in the deaths of at least 70,000 civilians and the displacement of 1.85 million people.

Another example is the infamous genocide of the Tutsis that occurred in Rwanda in 1999. Rwanda’s ethnic population was made up of the majority (about 82%) Hutus and the minority (17%) Tutsis. Tension did not arise between the two groups until colonization of the region by the Belgians, in which, the lighter skinned Tutsis were favored by the Belgians for their “pre-colonial standing” and supposed “racial superiority.” The issuing of identity cards between the two groups which classified them as either Hutu or Tutsis as well as the gap between the groups in regards to economic wealth and political power caused tensions to rise between the two groups.

In 1959 the Hutu’s revolted and took power from the Tutsis, backed by the Belgians who, though had originally favored the Tutsis, now backed the majority of the population, which was the Hutus. This uprising caused the deaths of many Tutsis, a large remainder fled Rwanda to form rebel groups and launch attacks from other African countries, which resulted in even more tension and hostility between the two groups.

Eventually, after years of fighting, a delicate truce was formed between the two groups, unfortunately this did little to stem the hatred years of conflict, death, and mistreatment had created between the two groups and the Rwandan genocide was the result. The Rwandan genocide resulted in 800,000 deaths within 100 days, making it the most efficient ethnic cleansing in humanity’s history.

IV. International Intervention

In both Darfur and Rwanda, the international community’s inaction has been highly criticized as a gross mistake and failure on the part of the United Nations as well as world leaders like the United States. In Rwanda, many international agencies refused to acknowledge that what was occurring in Rwanda was in fact genocide until it was already too late.

Additionally, the U.N. peacekeeping force that was deployed to Rwanda was only allowed to “monitor and observe” the situation and in no way intervene to stop the atrocities that were occurring. The commander of the peacekeeping force in Rwanda, Canadian Brigadier-General Romeo Dallaire, was unable to properly handle the situation due to budgetary concerns, which resulted in a gross lack of resources and capabilities as well as the fact that he was given only 2,500 troops rather then the 4,500 he had requested. General Dallaire also sent repeated requests to the U.N. to allow his forces to intervene and seize munitions strongholds that the Hutus were using to slaughter the Tutsis, all of which were denied.

Years later, analysts determined that if General Dallaire had been given the troops he requested as well as the ability to intervene he could have saved around 500,000 Tutsis, roughly half the number that was killed during the 100 day genocide. The situation in Darfur was similar in that, after a year of violence and fighting, only the United States classified the conflict as genocide. It was only after another additional year of death and destruction in Darfur that the U.N. finally stepped in and sent a peacekeeping force of 10,000 soldiers. 

V. Media’s Effect on Intervention

The media plays an integral role in the intervention of global disasters such as the genocide that occurred in Rwanda and the conflict that is still occurring today in Darfur. In fact, experts agree that it was the lack of coverage by the “Western Media” that was one of the leading causes of why it took so long for both the United Nations and world powers like the United States to intervene.

In Rwanda, there was little to no media coverage on the conflict as it was beginning to erupt. Being that there was little news coverage of the events taking place, the American public along with other leading nations were not aware of the atrocities that were being committed and that the United States and other leading countries should intervene. This “lack of coverage,” while detrimental to any chance of intervention for the Rwandan people, was not nearly as detrimental as to the inaccurate framing of the situation, specifically in regards to Rwanda, once the media did take notice of what was going on.

Rwanda was framed as a balanced, even-sided civil war between two “tribes” who had been battling each other since the dawn of time. Hearing this, the genocide in Rwanda quickly became old news and disregarded by the American public as an unending “tribal conflict” in which America had no business of getting involved. Even after news of the mass death and displacement of millions, the media began focusing its stories on the survivors of refugee camps, a much safer and simpler task then reporting on the atrocities happening within Rwanda. Lastly, the depiction of Rwanda as “The Heart of Darkness,” in that this was an African nation tucked deep within the chaos and turmoil that has always plagued Africa, also caused people to turn away from the thought of intervention.

VI. Conclusion

Genocide is one of the most, if not the most, dangerous and heinous crimes committed by man. However, given how large-scale acts of genocide usually are, they can only be committed if the international community stands idly by and does nothing. This includes the media, who have a responsibility to report and inform the people of the world of global atrocities, such as the ones that occurred in Rwanda. Without an accurate understanding of what causes genocide, as well as an accurate portrayal of the conflict and events surrounding a genocide, the international community will fail to intervene and allow genocide to run rampant.

Displaced Refugees and the Categorical Imperative

By Chris Saco
Mr. Saco entered Albany Law School in the fall of 2012. He is in the accelerated program and anticipates earning his J.D. by 2014.  While in law school, he has simultaneously pursued a Master’s Degree in Business Arts in Healthcare Management at Union Graduate School.  He hopes to complete both degrees by December.
Chris Saco graduated from the College of the Holy Cross in 2012.  He obtained his Bachelor’s Degree by double majoring in the fields of Economics and Philosophy.  In addition to studying Macroeconomic Theory, Global Industrial Organization Trends, and Domestic Anti-Trust Policy, Mr. Saco’s senior research topic in Phenomenology dealt primarily with unraveling the intricate complexities of epistemology – concluding that the observable occurrence of empathy in humanity curtails otherwise unruly passions; and this distinctive check on an individual’s emotions further nurtures universal moral agency.
Chris enjoys writing fictional novels and short stories, as well as stargazing and jet skiing. He is a Black Belt in the Korean martial art of Tae Kwon Do.
He prepared this presentation for Professor Bonventre’s International Law of War & Crime Seminar, Fall 2013.

Chris Saco's presentation encapsulates ethical theory, originating from his days as a Kantian Scholar in undergrad, in order to demonstrate how international policy embraces international persons. He seeks to dispel common myths about the status of international refugees by illustrating how the law qualifies refugees, and by demonstrating how morality plays a key role in the International Community’s response to recent crimes against humanity in Africa.
(click to enlarge slides)


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For the entire presentation, open HERE.
(It is then best to Download [by clicking on File] and then Open the downloaded power-point presentation.)

Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Role of U.S. Courts in Future Success

By Edward J. Ohanian
Ed Ohanian, a third-year student at Albany Law School, graduated summa cum laude from Marist College, with a major in mathematics and a minor in political science.
Mr. Ohanian is an associate editor of the Albany Law Review and serves as the student trustee on the Albany Law School Board of Trustees. He is a law clerk at Greenberg Traurig’s Albany office where he will join the firm as an associate after law school and the bar exam. He enjoys hiking, skiing and fishing, and has recently taken a particular interest in fly-fishing.
This paper was prepared for Professor Harrington’s Spring 2013 International Business Transactions class.

The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (“Hague Convention”), part of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, concluded on June 30, 2005. The overarching purpose of the Hague Convention is to “provide certainty and ensure[] the effectiveness of exclusive choice of court agreements between parties to commercial transactions.”

The Hague Convention was initially an endeavor that focused on achieving judicial cooperation regarding the enforcement of judgments generally But negotiations led to the more narrow purpose of ensuring judicial cooperation regarding the “recognition and enforcement of judgments in international disputes arising from commercial transactions to which exclusive choice-of-court agreements apply.”

Whether by design or compromise, the importance of judicial cooperation regarding the enforceability of choice of court agreements included in international commercial agreements cannot be understated.  If ratification of the Hague Convention becomes widespread, it could greatly increase the efficiency of international business transactions by diminishing ex ante uncertainty regarding the forum for potential litigation.

Part II of this Article proposes a hypothetical scenario that highlights the significance of uniform international enforcement of choice of court agreements with attention to the uncertainty left by Article 28 of the CISG. Part III explores core articles of the Hague Convention and addresses escape devices that have the potential to undermine the Convention’s overarching goal. Recognizing that ratification will cause state and federal preemption, Part IVa discusses the current state of U.S. federal law regarding the enforceability of choice of court agreements. Part IVb argues against domestic judicial interpretation of the Hague Convention that would allow U.S. courts to take advantage of the escape devices introduced in Part II thereby undermining the purpose of the Hague Convention and decreasing the likelihood of widespread ratification.
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To read the paper, open HERE.

Ius in Bello in Hybrid Political-Military Decision-Making

Efficiency as a Measure in Assessing Wartime Operations
By Heath Hardman
Heath Hardman is a third-year student at Albany Law School and graduate of Empire State College. He is the Editor-in-Chief of the Albany Government Law Review and has participated in the law school's Family Violence Litigation Clinic & Immigration Project. Additionally, he works as an intern in the Law Office of John N. Clo, in Gloversville, New York.
Before law school, Heath served in the U.S. Marine Corps for nearly 11 years, including two deployments to Iraq and two deployments to Afghanistan. During his service in the military, he completed the three-year Military COMINT (Communications Intelligence) Signals Analyst Program at the National Security Agency—a program consisting of 1500 hours of National Cryptologic School courses, working in three different organizations within the National Security Agency, and writing an in-depth technical paper.
He prepared this paper for Professor Vincent Bonventre’s course, International Law of War and Crime.


Throughout the history of war there have been innumerable instances of political and military failures.  These failures are often the result of poor decisions that have unnecessarily cost the lives of military and civilian personnel, damaged property and infrastructure, and led to great instability within the affected countries.

Although modern theories of war highlight obvious minimizing goals, such as reducing or eliminating civilian casualties and unnecessary destruction of property or infrastructure, the very fact that war is occurring, even if the minimizing goals are met, can cause great instability and anxiety and be very costly—in many ways. Once a decision has been made to engage in warfare, whatever the justification, the efficient accomplishment of political or military goals may lead to a shortened war, along with the associated benefits.

During war however, political and military decision-making, and political and military goals, are rarely made or developed in isolation from each other. Instead, a hybrid political-military decision-making strategy can be seen—both at the larger strategic level and at the discrete operational level. With this understanding, an efficient hybrid political-military operational decision-making process can lead to shortened wars, a more appropriate, and proportionate, outcome, and achieve political-military goals at a much lower cost as measured in lives lost, property damaged, and infrastructure destroyed. Inefficient decision-making can achieve the opposite, such as when military action does not support political goals, or when political mandates frustrate military goals or inflame insurgencies.

This paper will briefly discuss just war theory with a particular focus on ius in bello—just conduct in war. It will suggest a model hybrid political-military operational decision-making process, based on the U.S. Marine Corps’ war fighting philosophy, and use the battles of Fallujah, Iraq, in 2004, to illustrate both inefficient and efficient models. The Fallujah battles clearly demonstrate both the unnecessary loss of life and damage to property, and the need for an efficient model.
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To read the paper, open HERE.

The Genocide Convention: Promise but Failure

By Kayla Molinaro
Kayla Molinaro is a third year student at Albany Law School. She is an Associate Editor for Albany Law Review and a teaching assistant for Professor Mary Lynch's Domestic Violence Seminar.
Kayla prepared this memorandum for Prof. Bonventre’s International Law of War & Crime Seminar, Fall 2013.


I.    Definition of Genocide 
Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) defines genocide as,
“any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”[1]


II. Genocide Convention and the International Community’s Duty 
Adopted in 1948, the Genocide Convention stated that states were obligated to prevent and punish those who commit genocide because it was a crime under international law.[2]  The Convention further addresses the duty and responsibility of a state when it comes to the punishment of actors of genocide whether they are officials or private individuals.[3]  Under the Genocide Convention, prosecution should take place in a “competent tribunal” and the UN can be called upon to take necessary action to prevent such genocide.[4] 


III.  Empty Promises and More Genocide 
As Sarkin and Fowler point out, the phrase “Never Again” seems to be an empty promise when it comes to genocide.[5]  Attempting to make good on that promise, all the UN has done is adopt the Genocide Convention, but an institution to fulfill these obligations has not been created.[6]  Since there was no place to be held accountable, or even help with the prevention of genocides, genocides continued and a deadly one occurred in Rwanda in 1994.
After years of bitterness towards one another, Hutu extremists completely massacred one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus within 100 days.[7]  Radio broadcasts supported these killings, and whole families were exterminated by machetes, knifes and grenades.[8]  Rwanda is said to be the “most efficient and fastest genocide seen in modern history.”[9]
If genocide is agreed to be an international crime, if countries have a duty to prevent genocide, and if we have all vowed to never let another Holocaust occur, how does an even greater genocide happen—better yet, how does it occur and still get no international response?


IV.    Excuses For Non-Intervention 
April 7, 1994 the killings occurred; April 12th the U.N. knew of the killings; April 13th the killings were characterized as “genocide”; April 19th Belgian forces left; April 21st U.N. began withdrawing forces; April 25th all were withdrawn except for a few.[10]  How is this intervention?
Bottom line is states should have taken action to prevent the killings, not run away from them.  Among the excuses for not intervening were lack of resources, no authorization or mandate to intervene, and lack of or inaccurate media attention.[11]  One could blame the media for not covering the genocide fully and accurately, but at the end of the day, countries adopted the Genocide Convention, and it is the states’ duty to fulfill those obligations.  And even though the concept of genocide is recognized, it still took the United States two months to even acknowledge Rwanda as genocide.[12]

V.          Prosecution
Finally, in November 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was created for the purpose of prosecuting the crimes of genocide.[13]  Due to the lack of lawyers and judges, Rwanda created Gacaca tribunals, which lead to a number of convictions.[14]  Issues arose with these tribunals however because of the lack of formality and resources afforded to prosecute.[15]  The United States and other states have the duty to prosecute these crimes, as we have seen under the Genocide Convention.  This duty is further recognized that when the International Criminal Court (ICC) was created in 1998, with the purpose and goal of prosecuting war crimes, and with the hope that these crimes will not go unpunished.[16]  With the ICC, came the duty of 160 states to exert jurisdiction over those individuals who have committed crimes such as genocide.[17]  In 2006, the Security Council renewed the emphasis on a state’s responsibility to prosecute those responsible for genocide.[18]  

VI.       Constant Recognition But Constant Failure
Since the Holocaust, genocide has constantly been viewed as an international crime that needs to be prevented; yet when the time comes to act on it, every state drops the ball.  The concept of punishing individuals and intervening when genocide occurs has been recognized prior to 1994, and after 1994, so why was it not recognized in 1994?  Genocide will end when states fulfill their duty to prevent it from happening and prosecute it when it occurs, instead of making excuses.  Justice Jackson hit it on the head when he stated, “We are able to do away with domestic tyranny and violence and aggression by those in power against the rights of their own people only when we make all men answerable to law.”[19]


[1] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (Dec. 9, 1948), available at http://www.oas.org/dil/1948_Convention_on_the_Prevention_and_Punishment_of_the_Crime_of_Genocide.pdf.
[2] Jordan J. Paust, Genocide in Rwanda, State Responsibility to Prosecute or Extradite, and Nonimmunity For Heads of State and Other Public Officials34. Hous. J. Int’l L. 57, 64–65 (2011).
[3] Id. at 64.
[4] Id.
[5] Carly Fowler & Jeremy Sarkin, The Responsibility to Protect and the Duty to Prevent Genocide: Lessons to be Learned From the Role of the International Community and the Media During the Rwandan Genocide and the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia33 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 35, 35 (2010).
[6] Id. at 37. 
[7] Id. at 40–41.
[8] Id. at 50–51.
[9] Id. at 50.
[10] Id. at 54–57.
[11] See generally id. at 51–60.
[12] Id. at 57.
[13] Paust, supra note 1 at 57.
[14] Id. at 58-60.
[15] Id.
[16] Id. at 65.
[17] Id. 
[18] Id. at 64.
[19] Id. at 85 (quoting Justice Robert H. Jackson at Nuremberg).

The ICJ: Composition, Cases & Clout [presentation]

By Brielle J. Danko
Brielle Danko is a third year student at Albany Law and is a teaching assistant for the Litigation Clinic. She completed her undergrad studies at Virginia Tech where she majored in English Pre-Law and minored in Women's Studies.
Brielle prepared this presentation for Prof. Bonventre's International Law of War & Crime Seminar, Fall 2013.

The International Court of Justice is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations. It is composed of 15 judges. There are two types of cases that the Court can entertain: contentious cases and advisory proceedings. But it can entertain a dispute only if the States concerned have accepted its jurisdiction. Even though the Court has a $47 million budget, it has a declining influence and is highly under-utilized..
(click to enlarge slides) 


___________________________
For the entire presentation, open HERE.
(It is then best to Download [by clicking on File] and then Open the downloaded power-point presentation.)

Genocide: Cannot Be Just Another Crime Against Humanity

By Deirdre R. Barthel
Deirdre Barthel is a third-year law student at Albany Law School.  She earned a Bachelor of Arts degree with dual-majors: Russian Language and Russian & East European Studies, as well as a minor in History, from University at Albany.
Ms. Barthel holds multiple leadership roles at the law school, including: Chief Justice of the Rockefeller Chapter of Phi Alpha Delta, Director of Competitions of the Anthony V. Cardona ’70 Moot Court Program, Senior Editor for the Center for Judicial Process, and Senior Editor for International Law Studies.  She is also a competitor on the law school’s travel team for the Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition, as well as the coach of the Jerome Prince Memorial Evidence Law Competition.
Ms. Barthel worked as a law clerk at the NYS Liquor Authority, for Judge Victor of the High Court of South Africa, at the NYS Inspector General’s Office, and at NYS’s Committee on Open Government.
This essay was prepared for Professor Bonventre’s International War & Crime seminar, Fall 2013.


Foremost, in an introduction to genocide, it is important to understand what is considered “genocide.”  The term was first used in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin because he “recognized the absence of any crime aimed to prevent and punish the murder and destruction of millions.”[1]

Relatively soon thereafter, the Genocide Convention of 1948 identified conduct that constitutes genocide in terms of actus reus and mens rea.[2]  The actus reus conduct is defined as to:
(a) include the killing of members of a racial, ethic, or religious group;
(b) cause serious mental or bodily harm to members of the group;
(c) bring about the group’s physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) prevent births within the groups; or
(e) forcibly transfer children of the group to another group.[3]

Along with this activity, “the mens rea, or specific intent, of genocide is that the perpetrator committed one of the aforementioned acts intending to destroy the group in whole or in part.”[4]  This mens rea is most likely the reason why the forced displacement of persons does not comprise genocide.[5]  The physical location of people does not categorize them in the same type of “group” that was intended for recognition by clause (a) of the Convention.

Some consider genocide the “crime of crimes.”[6]Others commonly misconceive that genocide is a crime against humanity, or use the two terms interchangeably.  An understanding of three differences between the two atrocities rectifies this confusion.[7]

Genocide occurs when victims of violence belong to a certain group (defined by race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion); whereas crimes against humanity means a broader victim pool composed of any human beings.[8]  The second distinction is that genocidal violence means the destruction of a particular group (once again, determined by race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion) and crimes against humanity are not so motivated.[9]  Finally, genocide may be an isolated event, while crimes against humanity are recognized by extensive violence.[10]

There is also a legal difference between genocide and crimes against humanity.  Genocide has been clearly defined by the Genocide Convention. This language has been applied to situations over the decades and closely adhered to.[11]  Crimes against humanity are classified in the statutes of international courts or tribunals, which do not have the same controlling power as the Genocide Convention.[12]

Further, this Convention created a duty on states not to commit genocide, to prevent genocide from occurring or continuing, and to punish genocide.[13]  By contrast, such duties are not specifically imposed for crimes against humanity in any similar way.

With this understanding of genocide, the next step is to identify specific behaviors in history that have been deemed genocide.

Armenian people have argued for decades that when the Ottoman Empire, current day Turkey, moved onto their land and forced people from their homes, this was the first genocide the modern world knew.[14]  Several Western countries’ legislatures have signed acknowledgements that genocide was committed in Armenia[15]in 1915. Indeed, the highest Swiss court ruled that the actions constituted genocide.[16]

However, it is arguable that a political revolution along with the forced dislocation of people is not genocide as the Convention is written. On the other hand, the uncontested genocidal event in history is the Holocaust.  That violence occurred based purely on the religious, national, or ethnic traits of people in and around Nazi Germany.

Genocides seem to be occurring more frequently,[17] based on the fact that the crime was only recently defined.  During the Bosnian conflict in 1993, war-related events targeted people exclusively for their ethnicity or religion.  These crimes lead to an international discussion about the duty to prevent genocide.[18]

However, when violence erupted in Rwanda in 1994, the international community did not intervene.  These Rwandan events implicated genocide.[19]One group of citizens had purposefully hunted and destroyed another group of citizens with the goal of exterminating that minority ethnicity.

The conflict in Kosovo from 1998 to 1999 targeted groups of people in the same way. This triggered discussions about a duty to prevent genocide that nears the level of jus cogens.[20]

Most recently, history seemed to repeat itself. In 2003, the violence in the Darfur region of Sudan was identified as a conflict against ethnic Africans by the ethnic Arabic-Africans.[21]

Genocide has been clearly defined since the mid-20th century. Incidents have been identified in the decades since then.  Moving forward, the global community must agree on a method of preventing this terror. Moreover, there must be greater enforcement so that such horrors do not continue to repeat themselves through history. 


[1] Sirkin, Micol, Expanding the Crime of Genocide to Include Ethnic Cleansing: A Return to Established Principles in Light of Contemporary Interpretations, 33 Seattle U. L. Rev. 489, 494 (2010) (citing Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule In Occupied Europe 79 (1944)).
[2] Antonio Cassese, International Law 373, 444-45 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2nd. ed. 2005).
[3] Id. at 444.
[4] Id. at 445. 
[5] Sirkin, supra note 1, at 490. 
[6] Sarah Mazzochi, Humanitarian Intervention in a Post-Iraw, Post-Darfur World: Is There Now A Duty to Prevent Genocide Even Without Security Council Approval?, 17 Ann. Surv. Int’l & Comp. L. 111, 128 (Golden Gate Univ 2011) (citinggenerally, William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes 529 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2nd. ed. 2009)).
[7] Sirkin, supra note 1, at 493. 
[8] Id
[9] Id.  
[10] Id.  
[11] Id. at 496. 
[12] Id.  
[13] Id.  
[14] Keskin Eren, Armenian Genocide “Yesterday and Today,” 4 U. St. Thomas J. L & Pub. Pol’y 31 (2010). 
[15] Harut Sassouian, Genocide Recognition and a Quest for Justice, 32 Loy. L. A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 115, 117 (2010). 
[16] Sassouian, supranote 15, at 121. 
[17] Recent years is considered as the past twenty years.
[18] Mazzochi, supranote 6, at 123. 
[19] Alette Smeulers & Lotte Hoex, Studying the Microdynamics of the Rwandan Genocide, 50 Brit. J. Criminology 435, 435 (2010).  
[20] Mazzochi, supranote 6, at 123. 
[21] Sirkin, supranote 1, at 516.  

Protections & Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights

Attention to Detail--Here, Less is Not Always More

By Nicole Camuti
Nicole Camuti is a 2013 graduate of Albany Law School, currently active in the intellectual property law community and human rights areas. During law school, Nicole held positions at Kenyon & Kenyon, LLP as well as Sony Corporation of America. Prior to attending law school, Nicole graduated New York Institute of Technology with magna cum laude honors in engineering and business.
While at Albany Law, she worked for Professor Harrington as a research assistant and was the Executive Editor of International Law Studies. Nicole continues to pursue her passion for trademark law, being active with INTA on their new gTLD expansion and the NYSBA Intellectual Property Section. She is also committed to her human rights research and involvement in evolving laws.
This paper was prepared for Prof. Harrington's International Business Transactions course, Spring 2013.


Free trade agreements vary in length and detail. With respect to intellectual property rights, it is unfortunately more often true than not that highly developed countries provide greater safeguards for Intellectual Property than do less developed and developing countries.

There are serious differences in the rights granted to intellectual property owners between each free trade agreements. In turn, these differences often affect the general population's ability, for example, to obtain pharmaceutical products. The same is true for technology--whether it be life saving diagnostic tools or wireless internet service.

This paper addresses some significant similarities and differences in recent free trade agreements, as well as some key issues arising from those differences.
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To read the paper, open HERE.



Security Council Peacekeeping Operations: U.N. Failure at Keeping the Peace

By Emily von Werlhof
Emily von Werlhof, Editor-in-Chief of International Law Studies, is a third year student at Albany Law School concentrating in International Law. She is a native Californian and alumna of the University of Washington.
At the Law School, Emily has been active in Albany Law's Women's Law Caucus and the Family Violence Litigation Clinic and Immigration Project (FVLC). She was a member of the first student team to handle an immigration case, and she helped get freedom from domestic violence declared to be a fundamental human right in Albany. She recently spent her summer interning for a judge on the South Gauteng High Court in Johannesburg, South Africa, as well as working on immigration and refugee law as an intern for the Legal Resources Center in Cape Town.
Emily has also worked with the Albany Law Pro Bono Society Veteran’s Project, was last year’s chair of the Donna Jo Morse Client Counseling and Negotiation Competition, and is currently an article editor for the Albany Government Law Review.
She prepared this paper as an Independent Research Project with Prof. Alexandra Harrington.


The United Nations (U.N.) Security Council was established through the U.N. Charter as one of the six main organs of the United Nations. Pursuant to Chapter V, Article 24 of the U.N. Charter, membership of the U.N. confers on the Security Council “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”

The Security Council first met in London, in 1946, and is now permanently located in the U.N. Headquarters in New York. In order to carry out the Security Council’s responsibility, peacekeeping forces have been utilized.

The U.N. Security Council is responsible for U.N. Peacekeeping Operations around the world. The first peacekeeping operation was launched in 1948. Currently, U.N. Peacekeeping forces are deployed on four continents with 15 active operations.

This paper will discuss the effectiveness of the U.N. Security Council in carrying out its primary responsibility by evaluating the ability of U.N. Peacekeepers to successfully complete their mandate, and comparing that success to the monetary, social, and political costs of deploying Peacekeepers. The first section of this paper will examine the structure of the U.N. Security Council and its operating constraints. The second section will evaluate the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, Pakistan, Congo, Lebanon, and Sudan, as well as their ability to successfully carry out their mission mandate.

The third section will discuss the monetary, social, and political costs of the several operations evaluated in section two. The fourth section will conclude by arguing that the U.N Security Council has failed to uphold its primary responsibility because the monetary, social, and political costs of deploying peacekeepers significantly outweighs the success of peacekeeping operations and is in need of restructuring.
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To read the paper, open HERE

Scottish Secession: An Unnecessary Independence

As Seen Through the Currency Debate

By Brett T. Williams
Brett Williams, a third year student at Albany Law School, graduated magna cum laude from the State University of New York College at Plattsburgh. He majored in History, minored in Political Science and spent six months studying the politics and history of Britain and Europe at the University of Oxford. He also presented a paper on U.S.–Turkish relations to a student conference at Dokuz Eylul University in Izmir, Turkey.
At Albany Law, Brett is an Associate Editor for the Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology, a research assistant for Professor Keith Hirokawa, and three-year member of the Albany Law Rugby Football Club. His legal work includes time spent with the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation, the Town of Colonie Town Attorney, and the law office of Flink Smith, LLC. Brett is involved with the Global Institute for Health and Human Rights pro bono project and is a great lover of travel.
This paper was prepared for Prof. Harrington’s Spring 2013 International Business Transactions class.


Since taking control of Scotland’s Parliament in 2011, the Scottish National Party (SNP) has advocated for its country’s secession from the United Kingdom. In order to make the case for this controversial policy position, the SNP has pointed to everything from economic and political freedom, to Scotland’s centuries’ old rivalry with its English neighbors to the south.

Nevertheless, less than 30% of Scots currently favor of independence. Clearly, the SNP has much convincing left to do. The referendum vote has been set for September of 2014.

One of the thorniest issues to address before that time is the question over what currency an independent Scotland would use. Three choices have featured most prominently in the debate: the Euro, the Pound Sterling, and a new, independent Scottish currency.
This paper considers each of these options. Ultimately, the purpose is to assess the viability of Scotland’s independence movement through the framework of the currency debate.
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To read the paper, open HERE